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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Jacob M. Torrez appeals from the district court's restitution order entered
following his conviction for aggravated driving under the influence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A police officer responded to a report of a disturbance at Kuna State Park.
(PSI, p.3.) Witnesses reported that two males were threatening physical violence
against people at the park. (Id.) The officer located the men, Jacob Torrez and
Andrew Capcha, and observed that both had slurred speech and glassy
bloodshot eyes. (Id.) The officer told the men not to drive and advised them he
would call a taxi. (Id.)
Shortly thereafter, Torrez drove away with Capcha as his passenger.
(PSI, p.3.) Torrez struck a vehicle at a nearby intersection and fled the scene.
(ld.) A police chase ensued, during which Torrez traveled at speeds exceeding
100 mph.

(ld.)

Torrez then lost control of his vehicle, hit a tree, and rolled

numerous times. (Id.) Both Torrez and Capcha sustained serious injuries. (Id.)
The state charged Torrez with aggravated DUI, leaving the scene of an
accident involving vehicle damage, and driving without privileges (third offense).
(R., ppAO-42.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Torrez pled guilty to aggravated
DUI and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.95-107.) The district
court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with three years fixed.
108.)
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(R., pp.105-

The state requested the court to order Torrez to pay a total of $82,837.61
in restitution - $79,518.55 to Ada County Indigent Services for amounts paid on
behalf of Capcha, $56 to Capcha himself, and the remainder to medical and
insurance providers. (R., pp.115-116; Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.3.) Torrez did not
challenge the state's calculation of damages, but argued that the court should
reduce the restitution amount pursuant to principles of comparative negligence
based upon Capcha's voluntary act of riding in a vehicle with a person he knew
to be intoxicated.

(Tr., pA, L.14 - p.15, L.14.)

Torrez also argued that Ada

County Indigent Services was not a "victim" pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304.

(Tr.,

p.i0, L.20 - p.i2, L.25.)
The district court declined to apply comparative negligence principles and
determined that the Ada County Indigent Services was a victim pursuant to I.C. §
19-5304. (Tr., p.20, L.i7 - p.26, L.i9.) The district court ordered Torrez to pay
restitution as requested by the state. (R., pp.ii5-ii6.) Torrez timely appealed.
(R., pp.ii7-i19.)
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ISSUE
Torrez states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded
$79,518.55 in restitution to Ada County Indigent Services?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Torrez failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
declining to apply comparative negligence principles to Torrez's restitution order?
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ARGUMENT
Torrez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Declining To Apply Comparative Negligence Principles To Torrez's Restitution
Order

A.

Introduction
Torrez contends that the district court abused its discretion when it

declined to apply comparative negligence principles to its restitution order
entered against Torrez.

(Appellant's brief, pp.7-17.)

Torrez's contention fails

because the language of I.C. § 19-5304 does not require a district court to
perform such an analysis.
B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute presents questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed
to the trial court's discretion, as guided by the factors set forth in I.C. § 195304(7). State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 2010);
State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. App. 2008); In Re
Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284, 192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. App. 2008).
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C.

Idaho Code § 19-5304 Does Not Require A District Court To Apply
Comparative Negligence Principles To Restitution Determinations
Because "the best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the

interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v.
Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).

Where the statutory

language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law
as written.

McLean v. Maverick County Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135

P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only
one reasonable interpretation, it is the court's duty to give the statute that
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,
894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was
"palpably absurd").
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make
restitution to the victim."

Idaho crime victims are constitutionally entitled "[t]o

restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing the offense that
caused the victim's loss." Idaho Const. art. I, § 22 (7). Where there is a causal
connection between conduct for which a defendant is convicted and the injuries
suffered by the victim, a district court is required to order restitution "[u]nless the
court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or
undesirable." I.C. § 19-5304(2). In determining whether to order restitution and
the amount of such restitution, a district court is required to consider: "the amount
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of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; the financial
resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as
the court deems appropriate." I.C. § 19-5304(7).
Contrary to Torrez's contention on appeal, I.C. § 19-5304 does not require
a district court to apply principles of comparative negligence and assign blame to
a victim for his own economic losses. Torrez contends that such a requirement
is implicit in the language of I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) and (2), which limits restitution
to those economic losses "resulting from the criminal conduct." (Appel/ant's brief,
pp.11-14.)

Torrez contends that any contrary interpretation would render this

statutory language superfluous. (Id.) Torrez's contention fails.
Language from I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) and (2) restricting restitution to those
economic losses resulting from criminal conduct does not require a district court
to apply comparative negligence principles to restitution determinations, nor is
that language superfluous. Instead, Idaho appellate courts have interpreted this
language to require that "in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a
causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and
the injuries suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249
P.3d 398, 401 (2011); State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 391-394, 271 P.3d 1243,
1247-1250 (Ct. App. 2012). In Corbus, the Idaho Court of Appeals did not, as
Torrez asserts (Appellant's brief, p.11), implicitly require a district court to apply
comparative negligence principles in criminal restitution proceedings, it instead
analyzed whether the victim's losses were actually or proximately caused by
Corbus' criminal conduct, or by an intervening, superseding cause. Corbus, 150
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Idaho at 602-606, 249 P.3d at 401-405 (holding that vehicle passenger's act of
jumping from vehicle during police chase was actually and proximately caused by
driver's criminal conduct for restitution liability purposes).
While I.C. § 19-5304 thus requires a causal connection between criminal
conduct and economic loss, it does not require a district court to analyze a crime
victim's personal judgment that may have placed him or her in a position of
vulnerability, unless that judgment constitutes an intervening actual or proximate
cause of the economic loss. While Capcha certainly exercised poor judgment in

voluntarily entering a vehicle with the intoxicated Torrez, his injuries were
caused, for the purposes of restitution liability, by Torrez's criminal conduct.
Capcha would not have been injured but for Torrez's criminal conduct. It was
also reasonably foreseeable that harm to Torrez's passenger would flow from his
criminal conduct of driving under the influence.
This Court should therefore decline Torrez's invitation to look beyond the
express language of I.C. § 19-5304 and require, for the first time, district courts to
apply contributory negligence principles to restitution determinations.

If the

legislature wished to so constrain the district court's discretion, it could have
done so, either by including a victim's own fault within the I.C. § 19-5304(7) list of
factors a district court must consider before ordering restitution, or by including a
provision allowing criminal defendants challenging restitution orders to assert any
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defenses it could raise in civil actions. 1 Rather than create such provisions, the
legislature provided a statutory scheme under which an individual is responsible
for the economic damages actually or proximately caused by his crimes.
Additionally, one of the purposes of the Idaho restitution statute is to obviate
the need for victims to incur the cost and inconvenience of a separate civil action
in order to gain compensation for their losses. State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165,
167, 139 P.3d 767, 769 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622,624,
97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 2004). This purpose would be compromised if I.C. §
19-5304 were interpreted to require prolonged evidentiary hearings on the
respective comparative negligence of criminals and victims.

Idaho Code § 19-

5304 does not require a district court to replicate a civil action and determine a
defendant's restitution liability in accordance with the strict rules of damages and
fault attribution applicable to a civil case. See People v. Johnson, 780 P.2d 504
(Colo. 1989) (holding that trial court erred in applying contributory negligence
principles and by declining to award restitution to a passenger injured by an
intoxicated driver's criminal conduct); see also Doe 146 Idaho at 285, 192 P.3d at
1109 ("it is not the intent of [I.C. § 19-5304] to maintain the strict level of
evidentiary requirements in restitution hearings that is required in trials.")
Further, a mandatory comparative analysis of a crime victim's fault would
be contrary to the intended benefits of criminal restitution derived by the state,
which include the promotion of the "rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of the
1For example, MCA § 46-18-244(2) expressly permits Montana criminal
defendants to "assert any defense that the offender could raise in a civil action
for the loss for which the victim seeks compensation."
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criminal law." State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 378, 93 P.3d 708, 709 (Ct. App.
2004); see also State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813,815-816,932 P.2d 936, 938939 (Ct. App.1997) ("A restitution requirement facilitates rehabilitation by
confronting the defendant with the consequences of his or her criminal conduct
and forcing the defendant to accept financial responsibility for the resulting
harm.") As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasoned in rejecting an argument
similar to that made by Torrez in this case, "[tJo allow a defendant who has
already been convicted of a crime to focus on the action of a victim to avoid
restitution defeats this purpose [of rehabilitation and deterrence] to evade
responsibility for his own actions." State v. Knoll, 614 N.W.2d 20, 24-25 (Wis.
App.2000).
Finally, even if the district court was required to apply comparative
negligence principles in this case, it could only reduce the $56 amount it ordered
Torrez to pay Capcha.

As the district court concluded, Ada County Indigent

Services, to whom the court ordered Torrez to pay $79,518.55, was a victim in its
own right, and entitled to restitution. 2 (Tr., p.21, L.15 - p.23, LA.) Torrez has not
and cannot show that Ada County Indigent Services was itself somehow
comparatively negligent, or that it was required to make its own comparative
negligence determination before paying medical bills on behalf of Capcha.
Because Torrez has failed to show that I.C. § 19-5304 requires a district
court to consider a victim's comparative negligence in determining restitution, he

2

Torrez has not challenged this determination on appeal.
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has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in declining to
do so in this case.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
restitution order.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2013.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of August 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BEN PATRICK McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
'i
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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